diff --git a/docs/mfv_russia/MJ_Manuscript_2024.md b/docs/mfv_russia/MJ_Manuscript_2024.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b759dd --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/mfv_russia/MJ_Manuscript_2024.md @@ -0,0 +1,2029 @@ +# Validation of the Russian Version of the Realistic Moral Vignettes for Studies of Moral Judgments + +Zorina Rakhmankulova1, Rustam +Asgarov1,2, Eliana Monahhova3, Semyon +Mening3,4, Isak B. Blank1, Vasily +Klucharev1 + +1 International Laboratory of Social +Neurobiology, Institute for Cognitive Neuroscience, National Research +University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia + +2 Food and Biotechnology Department, +Faculty of Engineering, Baku Engineering University, Baku, +Azerbaijan + +3 Centre for Cognition and Decision +Making, Institute for Cognitive Neuroscience, National Research +University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia + +4 Laboratory for Cognitive Research, +Faculty of Social Sciences, National Research University Higher School +of Economics, Moscow, Russia + +Zorina Rakhmankulova +[https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9294-2983](https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9294-2983) + +Rustam Asgarov +[https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6739-6394](https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6739-6394) + +Eliana Monahhova +[https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9426-3642](https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9426-3642) + +Semyon Mening +[https://orcid.org/0009-0007-1740-4932](https://orcid.org/0009-0007-1740-4932) + +Vasily Klucharev +[https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5257-3789](https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5257-3789) + +Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Eliana +Monahhova or Rustam Asgarov, Center for Cognition and +Decision Making, Institute for Cognitive Neuroscience, National Research +University Higher School of Economics, Krivokolenny Pereulok 3, 101000 +Moscow, Russia. Email: +[e.monakhova@hse.ru;](mailto:e.monakhova@hse.ru) +[rustamasgarov@gmail.com](mailto:rustamasgarov@gmail.com) + +# Abstract + +Moral judgments and behavior are shaped by individual +experiences and cultural environments. In two online studies, we used a +standard set of moral vignettes to examine the generalizability of the +original factor structure of moral judgments by testing two independent +samples of the Russian population (Study 1, N = 247; Study 2, N = +223). In Study 1, the exploratory factor analysis revealed three +components that accounted for most of the variance: norm violation, +social affect, and intention. In Study 2, the factor structure of the +identified moral components was validated by confirmatory factor +analysis. Latent profile analysis revealed five distinct profiles of +moral scenarios: Peccadillo, Illegal-Antisocial, Controversial Act, +Prosocial, and a novel profile specific to the Russian sample—Social +Conflict—as compared to the previous study of the American population. +These findings suggest fundamental similarities in moral judgment +processes across cultures while also highlighting culture-specific +patterns in moral scenario categorization. This study +also provides researchers with a battery of vignettes that can be used +in cross-cultural studies of moral judgment. + +*Keywords:* vignette, event feature, moral judgment, moral component, +latent profile + +# + +# Validation of the Russian Version of the Realistic Moral Vignettes for Studies of Moral Judgments + +Human moral judgments and behavior have been extensively studied in +philosophy, sociology, psychology, and neuroscience. Moral judgments +enable people to evaluate others’ actions, attitudes, and even +personalities according to certain social, cultural, and universal +norms. Some scientific and philosophical frameworks suggest that moral +judgments and behavior are predominantly influenced and guided by an +innately operating moral sense of intuitions and emotions, while moral +reasoning is regarded only as a post hoc cognitive process for +justifying prior moral judgments when inquired (Haidt, 2001). +Importantly, an evolutionary perspective suggests that moral judgments +and morality support within-group altruism, cooperation, and normative +behavior (Greene & Haidt, 2002) and survival (Hawley, 2003). +Furthermore, the social intuitionist model proposes that the moral +judgments and moral behavior of an individual develop in a social and +cultural environment by the individual’s intuitions formed through +interpersonal processes and experience (Haidt, 2001). Therefore, social +and cultural experiences should consequently influence the individual’s +moral intuitions via reasoned persuasion and social persuasion effects +(Haidt, 2001). Thus, it is particularly important to develop +experimental tools to study moral judgments in different cultural +contexts. + +Studies of moral judgments have used different types of stimuli, from +complex moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001), sentences containing +social norm violations (Heekeren et al., 2003), and moral claims (Moll +et al., 2001) to highly structured moral scenarios (e.g., Young et al., +2007). Few seminal studies have introduced and validated a novel +experimental paradigm to assess the moral judgments of subjects with +American cultural background (Escobedo, 2009; Knutson et al., 2010; +Kruepke et al., 2018). Using three types of cue words for emotions, +actions, and superlatives, summaries of real-life events with positive +and negative moral experiences were collected from the participants’ +episodic memories in the form of first-person short moral vignettes +(Escobedo, 2009). It allowed the creation of a set of standardized +stimuli in the form of vignettes (Knutson et al., 2010), which are based +on real-life experiences and improve the ecological validity of future +studies on moral judgments. Importantly, the findings from 30 +individuals and 312 vignettes (Knutson et al., 2010) were later +replicated among 661 participants and 117 vignettes divided into three +subsets of 39 unique vignettes (Kruepke et al., 2018). The factor +analysis consistently indicated a three-component nature of ratings +during moral judgments, including norm violation, social affect, and +intention (Knutson et al., 2010; Kruepke et al., 2018). + +Importantly, cultures differ in moral judgments and moral behaviors +(Graham et al., 2016), and moral foundations theory (Graham et al., +2013) emphasizes the role of social learning in moral judgments. +Furthermore, the individualism–collectivism perspective suggests that +more individualistic cultures emphasize individual rights, while +collectivistic cultures reinforce communal obligations and spiritual +purity (Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Graham et al., 2010). For example, +compared to participants in the United Kingdom, +Russians demonstrated more collectivistic attitudes (Tower et al., +1997), which have been associated with a higher tolerance of deceptive +behaviors used to avoid conflicts (Seiter et al., 2002). Some streams of +research have further suggested that compared to Western Europeans, +Eastern Europeans may hold the belief that multiple, even opposite, +truths are possible (e.g., Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Varnum et al., 2008). +Thus, it is possible that the Russian population might make moral +judgments different from those of the American population used in +studies that designed the standardized vignette sets currently +used to probe moral judgments. + +In the studies presented herein, we have attempted to replicate previous +findings using standard moral vignettes (Knutson et al., 2010; Kruepke +et al., 2018), further validate these vignettes, and examine the +generalizability of the original factor structure of moral judgments to +other cultures by testing two independent samples of the Russian +population. Our research question focuses on examining whether the +factor structure of moral judgments identified in the American samples +generalizes to the Russian population. This investigation is motivated +by prior research showing systematic differences between these cultures +in value systems and social cognition, particularly regarding +individualistic versus collectivistic orientations and variations in +power distance that could influence moral evaluations. We hypothesized +that while core aspects of moral judgment may be preserved across +cultures, culturally specific patterns may emerge in how moral scenarios +are categorized and evaluated. + +# Materials and Methods + +## Participants + +The studies included two samples of Russian-speaking participants +recruited using social media platforms. *Sample 1* (Study 1) was used as +a training sample to investigate factor structure via exploratory factor +analysis (EFA), while *Sample 2* (Study 2) was used as a test sample to +validate the model identified by EFA using confirmatory factor analysis +(CFA). Kline (2016) stated that the median sample size for uncomplex +models is around 200 participants, although having more than 200 +participants is usually preferred. The sample sizes in both Studies 1 +and 2 align with this recommendation. + +We invited 261 participants, (ranging in age from 18 to 66 years, mean +\[*M*\] = 25.0, standard deviation \[*SD*\] = 8.6, 190 females), and 236 +subjects (aged 18 to 66 years, *M* = 26.4, *SD* = 9.7, 162 females) for +Studies 1 and 2, respectively. Participants accessed the online +experiment and were provided with relevant online instructions. At the +beginning of the study, all individuals gave informed consent and +completed eligibility screening questions. Upon completion of the +experiment, participants were compensated with 300 monetary units, +equivalent to approximately 10.4 USD when adjusted for purchasing power +parity (OECD, 2023). The study was conducted in accordance with the +Declaration of Helsinki and received approval from the Ethics Committee +of the HSE University. + +All participants self-identified as Russian citizens with permanent +residency in Russia and confirmed via self-report that they had no +history of psychiatric or neurological disorders and were not taking +medication for these conditions at the time of the study. A total of +223 participants (44.9%) reported completing a +high school diploma as their highest level of education. Of the +remaining 274 participants with higher education, 162 participants +(32.6%) held a bachelor’s degree, 105 participants (21.1%) held a +master’s degree, and 7 (1.4%) held a doctoral degree. The diverse range +of degrees spanned various fields, from law, politics, sociology, and +mathematics to chemistry and economics. + +To ensure data quality, we conducted an *insufficient effort responding* +(IER) analysis using the intra-individual response variability (IRV) +method (Dunn et al., 2018). We calculated each participant’s IRV score +by summing the standard deviations of their responses across all scales. +Potential outliers were identified using both the 1.5 IQR (interquartile +range) method and the *irv()* function from the ‘careless’ R package +(Ulitzsch et al., 2022). In Sample 1, we +identified 12 downward outliers (4.60% of the sample; IDs: 118, 119, +126, 141, 149, 197, 228, 236, 243, 252, 260, and 261). These +participants were removed from further analyses. In Sample 2, we +detected five downward outliers (2.12% of the sample; IDs: 47, 61, 64, +130, 158) and four upward outliers (1.69% of the sample; IDs: 13, 24, +104, 151). The downward outliers demonstrated potential +non-differentiation or straight-lining in ratings, while upward outliers +demonstrated excessive variability in ratings, possibly due to random or +inconsistent responses. All identified outliers were excluded from the +further statistical analyses to enhance the overall integrity of our +dataset. Additionally, we conducted Mahalanobis distance analysis to +detect multivariate outliers in both samples that revealed two +multivariate outliers in Sample 1 (IDs: 2 and 74) and four multivariate +outliers in Sample 2 (IDs: 26, 35, 43, and 147) that were removed from +further statistical analyses. + +Overall, the final sample size used in all statistical analyses was n = +247 (age range: 18–66 years, *M* = 25.0, *SD* = 8.3, 183 females) for +Study 1 and n = 223 (age range: 18–66 years, *M* = 26.4, *SD* = 9.7, 156 +females) for Study 2. + +## Moral Vignettes and the Moral Judgment Task + +The vignette ratings were collected using an online moral judgment task +via an online questionnaire, with participants rating 39 vignettes +regarding 16 event features (dimensions), using 7-point Likert scales +with fixed-point sliding scales. Each scale was presented as a separate +question, following Kruepke's (2018) study. In the questionnaire, we +used moral vignettes from subset-3 (Kruepke et al., 2018), which were +previously tested on the American sample. Subset-3 was selected due to +its compatibility with Russian cultural contexts, requiring minimal +modifications. + +Out of 16 event features, the following 10 event features directly +represented the moral aspects of the vignettes (based on Kruepke et al., +2018): emotional intensity (1 = “Not at all emotionally intense” to 7 = +“Extremely emotionally intense”), emotional aversion (1 = “Not at all +aversive or unpleasant” to 7 = “Extremely aversive or unpleasant”), harm +(1 = “No harm to others” to 7 = “Extreme harm to others”), other-benefit +(1 = “No benefit to others” to 7 = “Extreme benefit to others”), +self-benefit (1 = “No benefit to main actor” to 7 = “Extreme benefit to +main actor”), premeditation (1 = “The action was completely unplanned” +to 7 = “The action was completely planned”), legality (1 = “The action +was extremely illegal” to 7 = “The action was extremely legal”), social +norms (1 = “This action breaks social rules” to 7 = “This action follows +social rules”), socialness (1 = “No other people involved in the action” +to 7 = “Other people are extremely involved in the action”), and moral +appropriateness (1 = “Extremely morally inappropriate” to 7 = “Extremely +morally appropriate”). + +Six additional features were more complementary and exploratory in +nature, providing additional context to the moral judgment aspects: +frequency (from 1 = “This type of event rarely occurs” to 7 = “This type +of event occurs all the time”), personal familiarity (from 1 = “Never +experienced this type of event” to 7 = “Frequently experienced this type +of event”), general familiarity (from 1 = “Never thought about this type +of event” to 7 = “Frequently think about this type of event”), self-harm +(from 1 = “No self-harm towards main actor” to 7 = “Extreme self-harm +towards main actor”), once vs. repeated event (from 1 = “One-time event” +to 7 = “Frequently”), and acted differently (from 1 = “Extremely +unlikely” to 7 = “Extremely likely”). + +The vignettes and rating scales (questions and their corresponding +anchor points) were translated from English into Russian and reviewed by +the expert to ensure accurate interpretation. Minor adaptations were +made to a few vignettes to make their content more familiar to the +Russian audience by adjusting names, places, countries, or currency (for +representative examples, see **Table 1**). Both the adopted and the +original versions of the vignettes, along with the event features +scales, are available online as Supplementary Materials on the Open +Science Framework: [https://osf.io/9k5b8/](https://osf.io/9k5b8/) +(**Tables S1** and **S2**). + +**Table 1** + +*Representative Vignettes Used in the Moral Judgment Task, Including the +Original Version and the Russian-Specific Version in Russian or English* + +| | | | | +|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Vignette No. | Original Version | Russian-Adapted Version | English Translation of Russian Version | +| 1 | When I first went to **dance** school in **New York** I lied about my age. There is a lot of pressure to be young in the dance industry. I was twenty and told people I was only sixteen. | Когда я только поступила в **школу моделей** в **Москве**, я солгала о своем возрасте. В индустрии моды очень важно быть молодым, поэтому я всем говорила, что мне шестнадцать, хотя в реальности мне было уже двадцать. | When I first went to **fashion** school in **Moscow** I lied about my age. There is a lot of pressure to be young in the **fashion** industry. I was twenty and told people I was only sixteen. | +| 8 | I am a very unfaithful person in general. I do not have a strong faith in God and I am constantly unfaithful to women. Recently I cheated on my girlfriend who comes from another **state** to see me. | Я в целом очень неверный человек. Я не особо верю в Бога и часто изменяю женщинам. Недавно я изменил своей девушке, которая приехала из другого **города**, чтобы повидаться со мной. | I am a very unfaithful person in general. I do not have a strong faith in God and I am constantly unfaithful to women. Recently I cheated on my girlfriend who comes from another **city** to see me. | +| 16 | I used to ride the bus everyday to work. One day I noticed a pregnant woman who did not have a seat. So I took her by the arm and helped her find a seat. | Раньше я ежедневно ездил на работу на автобусе. Как-то раз я заметил в автобусе беременную женщину, которой никто не уступал место. Тогда я взял ее за руку и помог найти свободное место. | I used to ride the bus everyday to work. One day I noticed a pregnant woman who did not have a seat. So I took her by the arm and helped her find a seat. | + +*Note.* The vignettes were adapted from Kruepke et al. (2018) with +cultural modifications for the Russian sample. + +The comparison of moral vignettes used for Russian and American +populations supported the validity of using the vignettes originally +designed for the American population for Russian participants. As shown +in **Table 2**, moral appropriateness, frequency, personal familiarity, +and general familiarity revealed close alignment between the Russian and +American samples. For instance, the measures of moral appropriateness +and frequency differed only slightly, indicating comparable perceptions +of the vignettes’ content. Additionally, the ranges for variables such +as the number of sentences and words remained consistent across both +samples, further supporting the comparability of the materials. While +differences in reading ease scores were observed—calculated using the +Flesch formula in Oborneva’s version for the Russian population +(Oborneva, 2006) for the Russian sample and the Flesch-Kincaid formula +(Kincaid et al., 1975; Flesch, 1948) for the American sample—these +differences were within acceptable limits, reflecting linguistic +variations rather than fundamental disparities in vignette +comprehensibility. + +**Table 2** + +*Characteristics of Moral Vignettes in Russian and American Samples* + +
| Variable | +Russians, N = 470 +(Present study) |
+Americans, N = 225 +(Kruepke et al., 2018) |
+||||
+ |
++ |
+Range | ++ |
++ |
++ |
+|
| Moral appropriateness | +3.88 | +1.71 | +1.7–6.6 | ++ |
++ |
++ |
+
| Frequency | +4.72 | +0.77 | +3.2–6.6 | +4.63 | +0.63 | +3.0–5.7 | +
| Personal familiarity | +3.37 | +0.90 | +2.1–6.2 | +2.72 | +0.85 | +1.8–4.9 | +
| General familiarity | +3.32 | +0.72 | +2.2–5.2 | +2.95 | +0.66 | +2.0–4.7 | +
| Number of sentences | +2.8 | +0.5 | +2–4 | +3.0 | +0.2 | +2–4 | +
| Number of words | +36.9 | +7.1 | +20–53 | +42.3 | +6.1 | +31–56 | +
| Number of characters | +217.6 | +41.4 | +117–306 | +204.9 | +29.5 | +154–261 | +
| Reading ease | +51.5 | +17.0 | +0–85 | +84.7 | +9.7 | +62–99 | +
+
+*Note.* The solid line represents the scree plot derived from the actual
+data, while the dashed line illustrates the scree plot for randomly
+simulated data with the same dimensions as the actual data. This figure
+clearly indicates that three factors should be retained, as the first
+three factors are distinctly above the random scree plot.
+
+The factor loadings for the 10 event features obtained using the
+principal axis factoring method with Varimax rotation and Kaiser
+normalization (Kaiser, 1958) are displayed in **Table 3**. Additionally,
+**Table 3** includes the factor loadings identified in the two prior
+studies (Knutson et al., 2010; Kruepke et al., 2018) on the American
+population, allowing for a direct comparison of the two populations.
+Similar to the previous studies (Knutson et al., 2010; Kruepke et al.,
+2018), the strongest common factors derived from EFA can be interpreted
+as norm violation (factor 1), social affect (factor 2) and intention
+(factor 3). Norm violation, with positive loadings from social norms,
+moral appropriateness, legality, and other-benefit event features, along
+with negative loadings from harm and emotional aversion event features,
+explained the largest part of total variance (46%). Social affect, which
+is primarily characterized by positive loadings from emotional
+intensity, emotional aversion, socialness, harm event features, and a
+negative loading from the self-benefit event feature, accounted for 17%
+of the total variance. The third factor, intention, explained only 12%
+of the variance and was driven by positive loadings from premeditation
+and self-benefit event features.
+
+**Table 3**
+
+*Results of Exploratory Factor Analyses (EFA) for the Russian (current
+study) and American Populations (from Knutson et al., 2010; Kruepke et
+al., 2018)*
+
+| Event Features | +Russians, N= 247 +Subset-3: 39 vignettes +(Present study) |
+Americans, N=225 +Subset-3: 39 vignettes +(Kruepke et al., 2018) |
+Americans, N=30 +Full set: 312 vignettes +(Knutson et al., 2010) |
+||||||||
| Norm Violation | +Social Affect | +Intention | +Norm Violation | +Social Affect | +Intention | +Norm Violation | +Social Affect | +Intention | +|||
| Social norms | +.970 | +-.160 | +-.024 | +.956 | +-.179 | +-.023 | +.947 | +.154 | +.144 | +||
| Moral appropriateness | +.968 | +-.208 | +.023 | +.951 | +-.193 | +-.042 | +-.956 | +-.102 | +-.120 | +||
| Legality | +.814 | +.154 | +-.083 | +.785 | +.335 | +-.046 | +.737 | +-.288 | +.115 | +||
| Other-benefit | +.806 | +.080 | +-.026 | +.898 | +-.111 | +-.054 | +-.883 | +.046 | +.051 | +||
| Harm | +-.864 | +.436 | +-.022 | +-.814 | +.460 | +-.048 | +.803 | +.473 | +.009 | +||
| Emotional aversion | +-.788 | +.588 | +-.035 | +-.521 | +.788 | +-.012 | +.336 | +.762 | +-.258 | +||
| Emotional intensity | +-.132 | +.698 | +-.018 | +-.213 | +.896 | +.067 | +.024 | +.896 | +-.066 | +||
| Socialness | +.030 | +.572 | +-.007 | +.087 | +.712 | +-.116 | +-.115 | +.763 | +.154 | +||
| Premeditation | +-.138 | +.134 | +.799 | +-.001 | +.201 | +.914 | +-.002 | +.175 | +.859 | +||
| Self-benefit | +.181 | +-.529 | +.731 | +-.069 | +-.371 | +.813 | +.244 | +-.304 | +.772 | +||
| Variance explained | +46% | +17% | +12% | +48% | +21% | +14% | +40% | +24% | +15% | +||
| Model | +scaled χ2 | +df | +CFI | +TLI | +SRMR | +RMSEA +(90% CI) |
+
| CFA | +122.914, p < .001 | +35 | +.828 | +.778 | +.138 | +.256 (.208; .306) | +
| ESEM | +50.413, p = .001 | +24 | +.948 | +.903 | +.046 | +.169 (.103; .234) | +
| CFA, +4 residual covariances* |
+92.935, p < .001 | +31 | +.877 | +.821 | +.130 | +.230 (.177; .284) | +
| ESEM, +4 residual covariances* |
+20.237, p = .443 | +20 | +1.000 | +.999 | +.031 | +.017 (.000; .137) | +
| Event Features | ++ |
+ESEM, 4 residual covariances | +||||||
| Norm Violation | +Social Affect | +Intention | +(resid) | +Norm Violation | +Social Affect | +Intention | +(resid) | +|
| Social norms | ++ |
++ | + | + |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
+
| Moral appropriateness | ++ |
++ | + | + |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
+
| Legality | ++ |
++ | + | + |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
+
| Other-benefit | ++ |
++ | + | + |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
+
| Harm | ++ |
++ |
++ | + |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
+
| Emotional aversion | +-.898 | ++ |
++ | + |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
+
| Emotional intensity | ++ | + |
++ | + |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
+
| Socialness | ++ | + |
++ | + |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
+
| Premeditation | ++ | + | + |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
+
| Self-benefit | ++ | + |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
++ |
+
+
+*Note.* Latent factors (NormV = norm violation, SocAf = social affect,
+Inten = intention) are in circles; event features (ScNorm = social
+norms, MrApp = moral appropriateness, Legal = legality, OtBen =
+other-benefit, EmAv = emotional aversion, EmInt = emotional intensity,
+Socil = socialness, Premd = premeditation, SlfBn = self-benefit) are in
+rectangles. Positive and negative loadings are colored in green and red,
+respectively, with opacity reflecting the magnitude of the loadings.
+
+## Latent Profile Analysis
+
+Following EFA and CFA, we also conducted an LPA using concurrent event
+feature ratings of the vignettes averaged across the participants. The
+goal of this analysis was to explore unique patterns of the
+participants’ responses to vignette stories based on their event feature
+ratings. We included ratings of the event features of emotional
+intensity, emotional aversion, harm, other-benefit, self-benefit,
+premeditation, legality, social norm, and socialness as indicator
+variables and excluded ratings of the event feature moral
+appropriateness for empirical categorization of the vignette stories
+(i.e., clustering of the vignette responses) in the form of latent
+profiles. The event feature moral appropriateness was excluded from our
+model-based clustering and classification analysis to explore it as an
+external variable and assess/compare the profile memberships predicted
+by this variable (Fraley & Raftery, 1998;
+2002). We used the “*mclust*” package (Scrucca et
+al., 2016) to identify the best fitting model and profile numbers
+using the Bayesian information criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978). Model
+fitting and cluster analysis of the data by simultaneous application of
+all 14 Gaussian mixture models of the “*mclust*” package revealed two
+models with the lowest absolute BIC values–model VII and model VEI–with
+various numbers of profiles. The best-fitting models with the
+corresponding BIC values and profile numbers are presented in **Table
+6**.
+
+**Table 6**
+
+*Gaussian Mixture Modeling of the Ratings of the Vignette Event Feature*
+
+| Gaussian Mixture Models | +Latent Profiles/ +Clusters |
+BIC | +
| VEI (diagonal, varying volume, equal shape) | +8 profiles | +-899.21 | +
| VEI (diagonal, varying volume, equal shape) | +5 profiles | +-929.19 | +
| VII (spherical, unequal, volume) | +5 profiles | +-929.40 | +
+
+*Note.* Individual vignettes are denoted by red dots, marsh triangles,
+green squares, blue pluses, or pink crosses stand for classification in
+the latent profiles 1–5, respectively. The profiles are depicted with
+color-coded ellipses and ellipsoidal centers; each profile is denoted by
+the cluster number in the figure legend. Сlusters 1:5 in the figure
+legend denote profiles 1:5, respectively.
+
+The identified latent profiles were labeled Peccadillo, Illegal &
+Antisocial, Controversial Act, Prosocial, and Social Conflict based on
+the previous literature. The profile Social Conflict was not identified
+in Kruepke et al.’s (2018) original study; however, it emerged as a
+highly robust category in our Russian sample, consistently appearing
+across both VEI and VII models. Notably, our analysis did not yield the
+Deception profile found in Kruepke et al.’s (2018) study; most vignettes
+previously categorized as Deception were absorbed into the Peccadillo
+profile in our sample. **Figure 4** presents boxplots comparing the
+distribution of ratings across each event feature for the observed
+latent profiles, allowing for a direct comparison of how profiles differ
+on individual moral dimensions. The vignette ratings for moral
+appropriateness were combined with the latent profile classification
+results to demonstrate both the quantitative and qualitative results.
+
+**Figure 4**
+
+*Gaussian Mixture Modeling for Classification of the Vignette Ratings
+across Nine Event Features as Indicator Variables*
+
+
+
+*Note.* Five latent profiles were identified and labeled as Peccadillo,
+Social Conflict, Controversial Act, Prosocial, and Illegal & Antisocial,
+based on a theoretical interpretation of the results. The vignettes’
+ratings of moral appropriateness are included to illustrate the original
+behavioral results.
+
+Thus, 21 vignettes out of a total of 39 vignettes were clustered and
+classified in the Peccadillo profile based on the participant ratings.
+The profile is characterized by relatively low ratings of emotional
+aversion, harm, and other-benefit. The Social Conflict profile clustered
+only three vignettes, depicting situations with interpersonal conflicts
+that occurred accidentally and unintentionally. Thus, the Social
+Conflict profile is characterized by relatively low ratings of
+premeditation, self-benefit, moral appropriateness, social norms, and by
+relatively high harm and socialness. The Controversial Act profile
+clustered five vignettes for which actions were perceived as having
+elevated levels of harm and premeditation, violation of social norms,
+and low moral appropriateness. The Prosocial profile clustered five
+vignettes for which actions were perceived as having nearly neutral
+emotional intensity, relatively low emotional aversion, high
+other-benefit (as compared to self-benefit), high socialness, legality,
+moral appropriateness, and compliance with social norms. Finally, the
+Illegal & Antisocial profile clustered five vignettes for which the
+actions were rated by participants as demonstrating high levels of harm,
+high emotional aversion, relatively high self-benefit (as compared to
+other-benefit), low legality and moral appropriateness, violating social
+norms.
+
+Finally, we conducted multinomial logistic regression analyses to
+explore how profile membership (identified in LPA) was predicted by
+moral appropriateness ratings as an external variable. Using the
+vignettes’ profile numbers, profile probability values, and averaged
+ratings ("nnet" package; Venables & Ripley, 2002), we sequentially
+assigned each profile as a reference category. For example, the results
+revealed that vignettes with lower moral appropriateness ratings had
+significantly higher odds of being classified in the Controversial Act
+and Illegal & Antisocial profiles compared to the Peccadillo profile (p
+= *.038* and p = *.039*, respectively). Full results of the multinomial
+regression analyses are provided in supplementary **Table S5** in
+Supplementary materials.
+
+# Discussion
+
+We conducted two online studies of Russian participants (Study 1, N =
+247 and Study 2, N = 223) who rated 39 moral vignettes on 10 moral event
+features (dimensions). We translated and validated
+standard sets of vignettes (Knutson et al., 2010; Kruepke et al.,
+2018) that provide a tool to assess the main event
+features known to influence moral judgments and can be further used in
+behavioral, neuroimaging, and cross-cultural studies. The
+original vignettes were developed based on real-life episodic memories,
+and each vignette event in the sets is characterized by previously
+well-defined key moral features (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996; Haidt,
+2007). Our results demonstrate the reproducibility of ratings of
+vignettes’ moral features for Russian, American and Iranian
+participants, but they also indicate some cross-cultural differences.
+Using qualitative and quantitative statistical analyzes, we observed
+highly similar responses in the evaluation of the vignettes’ event plots
+and event features by our Russian participants (current study) compared
+to American and Iranian individuals (Knutson et al*.*, 2010; Kruepke et
+al., 2018; Yazdanpanah et al., 2021).
+
+Similar to previous studies, our EFA of the event feature ratings
+confirmed norm violation, social affect, and intention as fundamental
+components of moral judgement. The
+significance of our findings for understanding the basis of human moral
+judgement is severalfold. Our findings regarding cross-culturally shared
+moral motives confirm the role of universally recognized basic moral
+concerns or intuitions (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993; Shweder et al., 1997;
+Graham et al., 2011). Our results support the
+multi-dimensionality of moral judgments and further demonstrate the
+importance of previously identified moral factors, including norm
+violation (Shweder et al.,1997; Haidt, 2007), social affect (Moll
+et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2002), and the intention (Koster-Hale et al.,
+2013). Similar to the American and Iranian
+populations, Russian participants demonstrated that social norms play a
+key role in moral judgments, followed by social emotions, and then
+intentions. Overall, the moral judgments of the participants in our
+study can be explained by their moral intuitions, as suggested by the
+moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2007; Graham et al., 2013). These moral
+intuitions support rapid, effortless, associative, and heuristic
+cognition developed in evolution and varyingly shaped by socio-cultural
+experiences from childhood (Graham et al., 2013).
+
+Our findings are also supported by the literature on moral psychology.
+Social norms and values have been previously reported as influential
+factors in the development of moral psychology and the behavior of
+individuals in different societal environments (Kohlberg, 1963b;
+Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990).
+Violation of social norms evokes moral judgment across various
+situations, as demonstrated by the norm violation factor in our
+findings. Similarly, the finding of the social affect factor is also in
+line with the literature on moral cognition and psychology. This
+component includes the event features of emotional aversion, emotional
+intensity, and socialness, and it demonstrates that individuals make
+moral evaluations through cognitive and socioemotional judgment of
+various moral features associated with different events and situations
+encountered in everyday real-life circumstances (Greene & Haidt, 2002;
+Haidt, 2007; Graham et al., 2009). Emotional brain responses have also
+been demonstrated in the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of
+a task involving passive visual attention to images of morality-evoking
+scenes (Moll et al., 2002). Our results confirmed the intention as the
+third component for the moral judgment of our participants. This
+component includes the event features of self-benefit and premeditation.
+Intention is generally defined as the instrumentality of the action,
+omission, or the character of the protagonist for self-benefit in moral
+events or situations by premeditation and planning of the protagonist.
+An fMRI study of a task for subjects reading narratives with accidental
+or intentional harms showed a distinct pattern of neural responses for
+accidental versus intentional harms, demonstrating that the
+intentionality of an action is an important component in moral judgment
+and behavior (Koster-Hale et al., 2013). The role of intentionality is
+even more pronounced in the analysis of intuitions in classic moral
+dilemmas, such as trolley dilemmas (Thomson, 1985; Waldmann & Dieterich,
+2007; Waldman & Wiegmann, 2010).
+
+Our ESEM modeling results generally confirmed the factor structure and
+variable loadings identified in the EFA. Three cross-loadings were also
+supported: (i) cross-loading of emotional aversion onto norm violation
+and social affect factors, (ii) cross-loading of self-benefit onto
+intention and social affect, and (iii) cross-loading of harm onto norm
+violation and social affect factors. Overall, these cross-loading
+profiles align with those reported in the American sample (Kruepke et
+al., 2018); however, emotional aversion had a somewhat stronger loading
+on norm violation than on social affect in the Russian sample, whereas
+in the American one, it was initially presumed to contribute more
+strongly to social affect (see **Tables 3** and **5** for details).
+Additionally, the negative cross-loading of self-benefit to social
+affect was more pronounced in the Russian sample, whereas the positive
+cross-loading of harm was stronger in the American sample.
+
+Previous studies indicated that that compared to
+Western Europeans, Eastern Europeans may hold the belief that multiple,
+even opposite, truths are possible (e.g., Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Varnum
+et al., 2008), which can potentially result in differences in moral
+judgments in different cultures. Among other characteristics, Russian
+and American populations also differ in collectivism and power distance.
+According to Hofstede’s model and its revision, the United States (IDV =
+91) is an individualistic country, whereas Russia (IDV = 39) is
+collectivistic. Furthermore, the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions model
+assigns Russia a score of 93 (out of 100) for the power distance, while
+the United States showed a score of 40. A prominent cross-cultural study
+investigated perceptions of the appropriateness of various responses to
+a violation of a cooperative norm and to atypical social behaviors and
+showed that appropriateness ratings of physical confrontation and social
+ostracism were negatively correlated with individualism and positively
+correlated with power distance (Eriksson et al., 2021). These findings
+are in line with the stronger loading of emotional aversion onto the
+Norm Violation factor in the Russian sample (in our study)
+compared to the American sample (Kruepke et al., 2018). The high level
+of collectivism may also explain the stronger negative cross-loading of
+self-benefit (fairness) to Social Affect in the Russian sample.
+
+Based on interpretations from available literature for sociomoral
+reasoning and behavior, we also identified the following latent
+profiles: Peccadillo, Illegal & Antisocial, Controversial Act,
+Prosocial, and Social Conflict. Interestingly, the Social Conflict
+profile was not identified in the original study of the American
+population (Kruepke et al., 2018), yet it consistently emerged in both
+our VEI and VII models as a highly robust category for our Russian
+sample. The cross-cultural differences in collectivism may perhaps
+explain some differences in the latent profiles in the Russian and
+American samples. Notably, our analysis of the Russian population also
+did not yield the Deception profile found in Kruepke et al.’s (2018)
+study of the American population. In our sample, most vignettes
+previously categorized as Deception were absorbed into the Peccadillo
+profile. Collectivistic attitudes have been linked to
+a tolerance of deceptive behavior when it is used to avoid conflict and
+support harmony (Seiter et al. 2002), whereas in individualistic
+cultures, saying the truth is often an important norm (Hall & Whyte,
+2008). Furthermore, Eastern Europeans often report the belief that
+multiple and contradictory truths are possible (e.g., Peng & Nisbett,
+1999; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2010; Varnum et al., 2008), which may
+affect their views on deception in various social contexts. Future
+studies are clearly needed to explain and replicate the cross-cultural
+differences in some aspects of moral judgments reported in the current
+study.
+
+Our moral study has some limitations due to project timeline
+constraints. The participants’ personality traits, emotional states,
+moral developmental levels, and other nonmoral cognitive functions were
+not assessed as additional measures. Therefore, future studies of
+morality should also include assessment of personality traits to examine
+the differential effects of traits and affective states on moral
+judgment and behavior. It should also be noted that 73% of our study
+participants were female. The statistical analysis did not demonstrate a
+significant effect of gender on moral judgments in our study; however,
+future studies should aim for gender-balanced samples.
+
+**Conclusion**
+
+In two (main and confirmatory) large-scale behavioral studies, we
+further validated a research tool that probes moral judgment using a
+battery of realistic vignettes representing both positive and negative
+moral experiences. Using qualitative and quantitative statistical
+analyses, we observed highly similar responses in the evaluation of the
+vignettes’ event plots and event features by Russian participants
+(current study) compared to American individuals (Knutson et al., 2010;
+Kruepke et al., 2018). Similar to previous studies, our EFA of the event
+feature ratings revealed norm violation, social affect and intention as
+fundamental components of moral judgment. Although the cross-loading
+profiles largely aligned with the previously published American sample
+(Kruepke et al., 2018), emotional aversion had a stronger loading on
+norm violation in the Russian sample than in the American sample.
+Notably, our LPA of the Russian sample did not yield the Deception
+profile found in Kruepke et al.’s (2018) study of the American
+population, whereas Social Conflict emerged as a highly robust category
+only in our Russian sample. Thus, our results call for additional
+cross-cultural studies for a more detailed validation of the realistic
+moral vignettes used in studies of moral judgments. Overall, our
+findings demonstrate the feasibility and reliability of the previously
+published vignettes (Knutson et al., 2010; Kruepke et al., 2018)
+narrating real-life moral scenarios for the assessment of moral
+judgment. The set of vignettes provides investigators with effective
+tools to ensure broad coverage of the key factors implicated in moral
+judgments in different cultures.
+
+# Declarations
+
+## Funding
+
+This article is an output of a research project
+implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National
+Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE University).
+
+## Conflicts of interest
+
+The authors declared that they had no conflict of
+interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this
+article.
+
+## Ethics approval
+
+The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki
+and approved by the Ethics Committee of the HSE University.
+
+## Consent to participate
+
+All participants were provided with brief instructions and gave informed
+consent before participating in this study.
+
+## Consent for publication
+
+Not applicable.
+
+## Open practices statement
+
+Supplemental Material and data presented in this
+study, as well as minimal code to reproduce the main findings,
+are openly and freely available online via the Open
+Science Framework (OSF):
+[https://osf.io/9k5b8/](https://osf.io/9k5b8/). None of
+the experiments in this study were preregistered.
+
+## Authors’ contributions
+
+Studies 1 and 2 were supervised by Isak B. Blank and Vasily Klucharev.
+Study 1 was established and planned by Isak B. Blank, Vasily Klucharev,
+and Rustam Asgarov. Study 2 was established and planned by Isak B.
+Blank, Vasily Klucharev, and Zorina Rakhmankulova. Rustam Asgarov
+prepared the Google questionnaire and collected the data for Study 1,
+while Zorina Rakhmankulova performed these tasks for Study 2. Zorina
+Rakhmankulova and Rustam Asgarov conducted the statistical analyses and
+prepared the relevant scripts for Study 1, whereas Zorina Rakhmankulova
+and Semyon Mening performed these tasks for Study 2. Zorina
+Rakhmankulova and Semyon Mening processed the experimental data for both
+studies and generated all final scripts, tables, figures, and
+supplementary materials. The initial manuscript was drafted by Zorina
+Rakhmankulova and Rustam Asgarov. The final manuscript was reviewed,
+edited, and written by Zorina Rakhmankulova, Eliana Monahhova, and
+Vasily Klucharev. All authors reviewed and approved the final
+manuscript.
+
+## Acknowledgements
+
+We express our gratitude to Anna Tokmovtseva from the Russian Orthodox
+University of Saint John the Divine for her invaluable assistance in
+calculating the reading ease index for the Russian-language version of
+the vignettes and preparing the supplemental materials. We also thank
+our colleagues Anna Shepelenko, Nina Kazanina, Ksenia Panidi, and Anna
+Shestakova from the Institute for Cognitive Neuroscience of the HSE
+University for their valuable help with the Russian-language translation
+of the vignettes and event feature scales, as well as their assistance
+with the recruitment of the participants.
+
+# References
+
+Asparouhov, T., & Muthén, B. (2009). Exploratory
+structural equation modeling. *Structural equation modeling: A
+Multidisciplinary Journal*, *16*(3), 397–438.
+[https://doi.org/10.1080/10705510903008204](https://doi.org/10.1080/10705510903008204)
+
+Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation.
+*Science*, *211*(4489), 1390–1396.
+[https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7466396](https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7466396)
+
+Bartlett, M.S. (1951). The effect of standardization
+on a χ2 approximation in factor analysis, *Biometrika*,
+*38*(3-4), 337–344.
+[https://doi.org/10.2307/2332580](https://doi.org/10.2307/2332580)
+
+Brown, T. A. (2015). *Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research*
+(2nd ed.). The Guilford Press.
+
+Burt, C. (1948). The factorial study of temperament
+traits. *British Journal of Psychology*, *1*, 178–203.
+[https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02288799](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02288799)
+
+Cattell, R. B. (1966). The scree test for the number of factors.
+*Multivariate Behavioral Research*, *1*(2), 245–276.
+[https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327906mbr0102_10](https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327906mbr0102_10)
+
+Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. A. (1990). A focus theory
+of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering
+in public places. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*,
+*58*(6), 1015–1026.
+[https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.1015](https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.1015)
+
+Crawford, A. V., Green, S. B., Levy, R., Lo, W. L., Scott, L., Svetina,
+D., & Thompson, M. S. (2010). Evaluation of parallel analysis methods
+for determining the number of factors. *Educational and Psychological
+Measurement*, *70*(6), 885–901.
+[https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164410379332](https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164410379332)
+
+Dunn, A. M., Heggestad, E. D., Shanock, L. R., & Theilgard, N. (2018).
+Intra-individual response variability as an indicator of insufficient
+effort responding: Comparison to other indicators and relationships with
+individual differences. *Journal of Business and Psychology*, *33*,
+105-121.
+[https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-016-9479-0](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-016-9479-0)
+
+Eriksson, K., Strimling, P., Gelfand, M., Wu, J., Abernathy, J., Akotia,
+C. S., Aldashev, A., Ananyeva, K. I., Andersson, P. A., Arikan, G.,
+Batanova, M., Becker, M., Birney, M. E., Boehnke, K., Bortolini, T.,
+Choi, H., Chu, Q., Chuang, S., Collins, E., ... Van Lange, P. A. M.
+(2021). Perceptions of the appropriate response to norm violation in 57
+societies. *Nature Communications*, *12*(1), 1481.
+[https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-21602-9](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-21602-9)
+
+Escobedo, J. R. (2009). *Investigating moral events: Characterization
+and structure of autobiographical moral memories* \[Doctoral
+dissertation, California Institute of Technology\].
+[https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-11112008-122002](https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechETD:etd-11112008-122002)
+
+Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003). The nature of human altruism.
+*Nature*, *425*(6960), 785–791.
+[https://doi.org/10.1038/nature02043](https://doi.org/10.1038/nature02043)
+
+Flesch, R. (1948). A new readability yardstick. *Journal of Applied
+Psychology*, *32*, 221–233.
+[https://doi.org/10.1037/h0057532](https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/h0057532)
+
+Fraley, C., & Raftery, A. E. (1998). How many clusters? Which clustering
+method? Answers via model-based cluster analysis. *The Computer
+Journal*, *41*(8), 578–588.
+[https://doi.org/10.1093/comjnl/41.8.578](https://doi.org/10.1093/comjnl/41.8.578)
+
+Fraley, C., & Raftery, A. E. (2002). Model-based clustering,
+discriminant analysis, and density estimation. *Journal of the American
+Statistical Association*, *97*(458), 611–631.
+[https://doi.org/10.1198/016214502760047131](https://doi.org/10.1198/016214502760047131)
+
+Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives
+rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and
+Social Psychology*, *96*(5), 1029–1046.
+[https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141](https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141)
+
+Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., &
+Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of
+moral pluralism. In P. G. Devine & A. Plant (Eds.), *Advances in
+experimental social psychology* (Vol. 47, pp. 55–130). Academic Press.
+[https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4)
+
+Graham, J., Meindl, P., Beall, E., Johnson, K. M., & Zhang, L. (2016).
+Cultural differences in moral judgment and behavior, across and within
+societies. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *8*, 125–130.
+[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.007](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.007)
+
+Graham, J., Meyer, L. H., McKenzie, L., McClure, J., & Weir, K. F.
+(2010). Maori and Pacific secondary student and parent perspectives on
+achievement, motivation and NCEA. *Assessment Matters*, *2*, 132–157.
+